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Online Social Networks (OSNs) are currently playing a crucial role in our everyday social
life. Their great growth has sparked the interest of hackers and individual users that try
to disclose as much information as possible, which in many cases unfortunately is possible.
In such events, the users’ privacy settings are bypassed by the leakage of their shared
media content. To address this challenging but important research problem, we introduce
a new distributed scheme for media content sharing on online social networks that may
minimize users’ privacy exposure, through automated procedures. The novelty of the
proposed scheme is the ability to enforce a user’s privacy policies across multiple online
social networks, even if she is not subscribed to all of them, without using a trusted third
party. Moreover, the proposed framework is a step towards enabling OSNs to interact,
exchange information with equal rights, independently of their size, focus and underlying
infrastructure.
 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
In the web based interconnected world, the processing,
storage and distribution of users’ data consist of very sen-
sitive area. Web communities, companies or even govern-
ments try to provide more secure and privacy oriented
services and regulate such services. Millions of users
worldwide share, everyday, huge amounts of private infor-
mation through blogs, wikis, Online Social Networks
(OSNs) and more social media applications. The technolog-
ical advantages in big data storage, cloud computing,
semantic web, mobile services and other fields, facilitate
the design and development of new social web services.Social media platforms like Facebook, Google+, Twitter
and LinkedIn have completely changed people’s behavior
on the web. Simultaneously, new social media like Pinter-
est and Instagram highlight that multimedia sharing, more
precisely images, either personal or computer generated,
are a modern niche market with huge revenues for the
service providers. Without any doubt, the biggest part of
the shared information within social media is multimedia
content, uploaded and shared by their users. Nevertheless,
the provided security and privacy is often questioned
[14,24,27,29].
Many of the privacy risks that a user’s privacy is
exposed to stem from the authentication and management
mechanisms of published information. Malicious users
have reportedly managed to bypass users’ privacy settings
of these services in many cases. As a result, new offenses
ranging from identity theft up to personal information
2 www.schema.org.
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uploading and re-publishing a user’s images, without any
form of notification, often harm the original owner both
social and economically.
It should be noted that the term of ownership, through-
out this work, should not be considered in terms of prop-
erty or copyright, but it rather refers to the fundamental
right to privacy. Users expect that by submitting their per-
sonal photos on OSNs, they are free to set their own pri-
vacy policies, allowing access only to the users that they
decide. The uploaded content is part of their private lives
and therefore belongs to them. Therefore, users should be
able to selectively reveal themselves to the world [15].
Modern users normally do not have a single account for
an OSN. In fact, users have accounts in many OSN and/or
even multiple accounts in some of them. Let us assume
that Alice and Bob belong to the same online social net-
work OSN1. Bob can easily download a photo from Alice’s
profile, obviously without Alice’s consent or any kind of
notification. Bob can make several alterations on Alice’s
photo offline, and then share it in another online social net-
work OSN2. It is clear that Alice will not be notified of the
incident and no matter what privacy policies she has set
on the photo, they will be bypassed.1
The core of this problem is that currently OSNs do not
check what multimedia are being uploaded, e.g. whether a
photo has already been published, by whom, what are the
privacy policies etc. Additionally, modern OSNs treat them-
selves as a separate entity, which have nothing to do with
any other OSN. Of course, even if many of the existing OSNs
have a different orientation like socializing, health issues,
professional or academic profiles, OSNs do not tend to inter-
act, in order to gather more users. Due to the competition,
this attitude seems fairly logical, nevertheless, redefining
the problem in the context of other services, such as tele-
communications or emails, reveals the importance of the
problem. In this case, the subscribers of one provider would
only be able to communicate with others of the same pro-
vider. However, the growth of both these services was
achieved because the userswere allowed to exchange infor-
mation independently of the provider. Therefore, to further
advanceOSNs it is crucial to allowanddevelopmechanisms,
in which all OSNs can exchange information.
This change is very probable to become a need quite in
the near future. According to several researchers, fragmen-
tation of current social networks is due to come. For
instance, Boyd argues that fragmentation is closer to the
human state of being since it allows them to focus on spe-
cific groups of interests, rather than generic and monolithic
ones [6]. Additionally, while major OSNs allow some
flexibility in creating smaller ‘‘groups’’ which are user cre-
ated and more coherent, their actual capabilities are rather
restricted, compared to smaller yet ‘‘specialized’’ OSNs. The
latter fulfill the actual needs of their target groups as they
are specially crafted for them, thus they are far more effi-
cient than trying to provide patches to allow some addi-
tional functionality.1 The case where Bob re-uploads the photo on the same OSN is addressed
in [37].Independently of whether fragmentation of OSNs will
happen, or how users log into their accounts, it is definite
that through cooperation, OSNs may protect their users
or even offer them additional services. In this work we
focus on former.
This work is motivated by the following research ques-
tion: ‘‘Can we have more privacy-aware solutions for current
Online Social Networks?’’. We argue that such solutions do
exist, even by applying well-known techniques. Thus, we
focus on how they can be achieved and their feasibility
within current structures, in terms of implementation
effort, processing needs and economic constraints. The
main contribution of this work is a new scheme that
enables collaboration between OSNs to enhance users’
privacy. The novelty of the scheme resides in the fact that
it is completely decentralised and does not depend on a
trusted third party (TTP). The proposed scheme counters
many problems that stem from sharing multimedia
content on OSNs such as identity theft, unauthorized con-
tent sharing and distortion of malleable content. Addition-
ally, the scheme allows a new feature, the shared
ownership of multimedia content.
One may argue that the current business model does
not allow for such changes as the big ‘‘players’’ do not have
the proper incentive to push such solutions forward. They
are well established and want to increase their market
shares. Therefore, one could claim that cooperation does
not seem probable. The recent example of Schema.org2
exemplifies that this is far from true. The search engine
giants decided to cooperate and create a common frame-
work that helps them to carry out their business easier
and more efficiently. One should also take into consideration
the role of regulatory authorities. The recent deal between
EU anti-monopoly authorities and Google3 signifies that
big players can be forced to play with more ‘‘open’’ rules.
Thus, developing a common privacy-aware framework for
OSNs under the pressure of regulatory authorities4 is not a
far-fetched plan.
It is worthwhile to notice that while OSNs disregard
each other, there is another link between many of them.
Major OSNs may not interact with each other, neverthe-
less, they allow smaller OSNs to exploit their authentica-
tion mechanisms. Therefore, the majority of smaller OSNs
are not registering their users directly, but rather obtain
user authorization, through e.g. OAuth,5 to use some of
the information from bigger OSNs. This fact indicates that
OSNs can further cooperate.
The main concept of this work is based on [37],
updating and extending the findings of the conducted
experimental results and discussing them in depth. How-
ever, the main contribution of this work is the introduction
of a novel distributed scheme, without TTPs, which allows
multiple OSNs to apply the privacy policies of their users
among them, even if one user is registered to a singlehttp://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-116_en.htm.
4 https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/
Documents/EDPS/Publications/Speeches/2014/14-07-14_PH_for_EV_
online_EN.pdf.
5 http://www.oauth.net.
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issues related to identity theft, unauthorized content shar-
ing, distortion of malleable content and shared ownership.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. Section 2
presents some related work such as privacy issues within
OSNs and some tools that have been proposed as solutions.
Then it provides an overview of digital watermarks and
illustrates the scheme of Zigomitros et al. [37]. Section 3
focuses on experimental results regarding image water-
marking adoption from three major OSNs. Then, Section 4
illustrates how to extend the Zigomitros et al. scheme to
more OSNs, allowing users to enforce their privacy policies
on multimedia content, even to OSNs where they are not
registered. Section 5 discusses the economical impact of
the proposal given the additional operative and mainte-
nance costs from OSNs. Finally, we conclude with some
remarks and ideas for future research.6 The shared multimedia content, can be considered an abstract attribute
of a user’s profile.2. Related work
2.1. Privacy issues in OSNs
Privacy in OSNs can be approached by different points
of view. Many researchers are focusing their efforts on
the publication of anonymized graphs that represent the
connections between users of OSNs. The majority of
attacks are based on neighborhood attacks, a special type
of attacks which is based on the fact that even if anonymi-
zation techniques have been applied on the provided data,
an adversary may exploit some background knowledge
about the ‘‘neighborhood’’ of a target victim. To this extent,
known relationships among its neighbors can be exploited,
leading to the re-identification of the victim. Therefore,
special anonymization techniques, belonging to what is
called privacy-preserving data publishing [11], are being
applied to protect users [36,12].
Even if the aforementioned attacks are very important,
we are interested in attacks ‘‘within the neighborhood’’.
This means that the attacker belongs to the victim’s neigh-
borhood, tries to enter the neighborhood or tries to create a
neighborhood that can be attributed to the victim. The
ideal scenario would demand users to allow access to peo-
ple that they truly trust, so that their shared information is
not leaked. Nevertheless, as everyday living shows, this is
not the case. People within social networks tend to have
hundreds or even thousands of ‘‘friends’’, allowing them
to access information that they would not do in real life.
Apart from the obvious problem of how people regard their
privacy on the Internet, we argue that OSNs should provide
more mechanisms to increase the privacy of their users
and protect them, as their privacy policies can be trivially
bypassed as shown in [27,37].
The main privacy issues in OSNs, as discussed in
[35,26], are the following:
In an Identity Theft attack, the attacker tries to mas-
querade as another person to hurt his social profile, or to
exploit the trust that other people have in his authority
and to obtain money, usually in form of credit. The victim’s
shared multimedia, which are usually of high quality, can
be used to launch attacks in real-life as well, e.g. print fakeID cards or company passes. Fraudsters can also extract
useful information from the shared multimedia content
on OSNs. In cyberspace the replication of victim’s account,
multimedia content and information, can be achieved eas-
ily while this process can even be automated [5]. Closely
related to the identity theft are the following two attacks,
which are often regarded as specific cases. If we have
replication of the victim’s profile in the same OSN, then
we have the so called Profile Cloning attack. Otherwise,
if the attacker exports the victim’s information and multi-
media content and creates a profile to another OSN then
we have the Profile Porting attack. This attack may be
more effective for victim impersonation since a search
query at an OSN will only return a single profile, the fake
one.
In the Sybil Attack scenario, a user creates multiple
accounts to manipulate and affect a result as desired by
him and his purpose [10]. It is essentially an escalation of
Profile Porting attack. The goal of the adversary can vary
from a simple voting scenario to a de-anonymization
attack.
If a user uploads a multimedia file, setting her desired
privacy policy for example to be shared only with her
friends, implies that she trusts her group of friends in that
they will not share or re-upload her file. Nevertheless, as
already discussed in the introduction, in current OSNs
her shared multimedia content is usually one click away
from bypassing her privacy preferences, leading to the
unauthorized content sharing attack.
Another privacy exposure stems from the use of static
links, which are used by the majority of OSNs. OSNs use
static links to bind the shared content, which can easily
be copied and arbitrarily shared on any other medium.
Finally, most OSNs do not allow shared ownership of
content. Anyone who possesses it is considered its sole
owner and can define privacy policies for it. Thus, if she
re-uploads it, she automatically can set different privacy
policies.
2.2. Tools for privacy in OSNs
In principle, it should be noted that very closely related
to our research is the work on Social Identity Management
(SIdM). This can be understood as the set of methods that
OSNs use to allow users to disclose information to specific
groups of their contacts. This allows them to manage the
attributes and information that they disclose regarding
their social identities/roles, attributed by others or them-
selves. As it becomes apparent, SIdM is not only focused
on multimedia content, but any attribute that an OSN user
can have.6 The interested reader is referred to [23,28].
Currently, several solutions concerning users’ privacy
on existing centralized or decentralized OSNs, have been
proposed. The bulk of these solutions come as external
applications and are not native solutions, having several
drawbacks that do not allow their wide adoption. For
instance, many of them are experimental solutions or
proofs of concept. Therefore, the interface and support is
534 C. Patsakis et al. / Computer Networks 75 (2014) 531–543quite limited. The nature of these tools might even bypass
the terms of service of each OSN e.g. as they use crypto-
graphic or steganographic methods, which hide the main
source of income of OSNs, information. Therefore, the solu-
tions which are discussed in the following paragraphs are
not widely used and many times users are unaware of their
existence. For instance, completely decentralized OSN
architectures like Diaspora,7 Safebook [8] and OneSocial-
Web8 never managed to attract massive amounts of users
to change the rules of the game.
In NOYB [13], groups of users share a key and break
their personal information into ‘‘atoms’’ which are then
permuted with the ‘‘atoms’’ of other users, using the key
to generate the permutation. Thus, the real information is
hidden from the OSN and the users who do not have the
key.
Persona [3], allows users to encrypt their data and
exchange a public key with selected users. This way, Per-
sona provides an attribute based encryption to users’ data,
which allows them to apply their desired privacy policies
regarding data access. EASiER [17] extends Persona, by cre-
ating decryption keys that are associated with each user,
allowing data access, only when a user contacts the proxy
with the appropriate key. Another encryption based tool, is
FlyByNight [21]. It mainly uses public key encryption algo-
rithms to exchange users’ messages in Facebook. Scramble
[4] is a Firefox extension which allows OSNs users to
encrypt their uploaded content storing it either at a Tiny-
Link server or the OSN.
PrivacyJudge [19] allows users to manage who can
access their posted content, hosted in their own or a
trusted third party privacy server. Data treatment is spec-
ified by labels to reduce the risk of accidental exposure of
personal information. In this area, we also have Lockr
[31] an access control system and Facecloak’s [22] which
obfuscates users’ profiles by providing fake information
to the OSN and storing personal information on an applica-
tion server in encrypted form. Another cryptographic solu-
tion was proposed by Patsakis and Solanas [25] who
propose a novel methodology for sharing data within social
networks. When users encrypt all their data, they create
small encrypted keyword dictionaries on the data that they
are willing to share. By sharing the dictionaries’ decryption
keys with advertising companies, users allow them to mine
their data. If they find a promising profile, they can place a
bid to access the full data.
Some privacy-aware solutions towards connecting
users have been proposed. For instance in [9], De Christof-
aro et al. propose the use of private set intersection (PSI)
protocols to disclose only the common connections that
two users have. On the other hand, based on PSI protocols,
Li et al. introduce a recommender system for social net-
works, which matches users with similar interests, without
disclosing their preferences [20].
Following radically different approaches we find X-
pire! [2] and unFriendly [30]. In the case of X-pi.e!, users
set expiration dates for their shared multimedia content,7 https://joindiaspora.com.
8 http://onesocialweb.org/about.html.to make them unavailable after that date. On the other
hand, unFriendly proposes a solution for enforcing multi-
party privacy in published photos so that they are co-man-
aged by the people who are depicted in them.
Finally, it should be highlighted that both Facebook [1]
and Google+9 have recently started using face recognition
services. The focus of these services is mainly to tag the
shared content and allow better search capabilities. How-
ever, one could claim that these services could also be used
to counter ID theft attacks. The main drawback of these solu-
tions is that the images have to be checked against huge
amounts of photos, so that even if the identification error
is quite small, the total of amount of false positives creates
an enormous amount of manual processing. On top of that,
one should consider the fact that many users tend to use
and share many common pictures, which would issue many
false alarms.
2.3. Watermarking
Digital watermarking is the process of embedding infor-
mation into media, usually in order to prove the origin of
the content and also its integrity. A watermarking algo-
rithm has to balance between the least possible distortion
and robustness while allowing the desirable capacity.
Nowadays, watermarking has been proposed as a solution
for a variety of applications with the most often being
copyright protection, authentication and tamper detection,
copy and device control, fingerprinting and metadata/fea-
ture tagging [38,7].
The most basic property of image watermarks is their
invisibility, that is they must be imperceptible by the
human visual system, allowing them not to be traced and
removed from unskilled attackers or to alter the quality
of the image. Depending on the application needs, water-
marks have different robustness. Fragile watermarks are
used to check the integrity of multimedia files, as the
slightest modification can break them, triggering an alert
to the watermarking system. Semi-Fragile watermark sys-
tems detect malicious modifications on the host image,
e.g. object insertion or cropping, while common image pro-
cessing as random noise and/or lossy compression do not
trigger any alarm. Finally, robust watermarks are made to
withstand a wide range of possible attacks as they are
mostly used for proofs of ownership. An attack from a
malicious user would be the removal of watermark or
making it undetectable. However, this should not be possi-
ble without a great degradation of the host image.
The capacity of the watermark refers to the maximum
number of information bits that can be embedded to a
multimedia file of a given size. Depending on the applica-
tion, the minimum capacity that is required can range from
1 bit, in copy control application, to a whole photograph.
Finally, there are two categories of algorithms based on
the requirement to access the original multimedia file dur-
ing extraction. Non-blind algorithms compare the original
with the watermarked image to extract the information.
On the other hand, blind algorithms do not need access to
the original image.9 https://support.google.com/plus/answer/2370300?hl=en.
Table 1
Summary of needed properties for application. Note: ⁄: varies.
Application/properties Invisibility Robustness Capacity Blind/non-blind
Copyright Both Robust ⁄ Both⁄
Auth. – tamper detection Invisible (semi-) Fragile ⁄ Both⁄
Copy control Invisible Robust Low Blind
Device control Invisible Any⁄ Low Blind
Fingerprinting Invisible Robust ⁄ Both⁄
Metadata – feature tagging Invisible Any⁄ High Blind
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aforementioned applications. For more on watermarking
and possible attacks the interested reader is referred to
[33,32].10 http://sourceforge.net/projects/test./files/.2.4. Enforcing privacy policies within a single OSN
Users trust their multimedia files in OSNs and the
majority of users do not seem to bother whether OSNs
alter their content due to resizing or compression, as long
as the content does not have visible distortions. When a
conflict of multimedia content ownership or misuse
occurs, OSNs are heavily dependent on user reports. This
approach has major drawbacks. The most obvious one is
the manual nature of the system. Secondly, this policy
enables a malicious user to report everyone, adding an
additional cost because there is not an automated system
to handle these requests. Finally, and perhaps the most
important, a user can report a misuse only when he
becomes aware of it, which is usually through another
user’s feedback or by sheer luck. For the latter case the
OSNs do not take any precaution measures, neither do they
offer any kind of notification mechanisms to their users.
Addressing these problems, as a first line of defense, a
dual watermarking scheme was introduced in [37]. The
solution might not solve the problem completely, as there
are successful watermark attacks, but in order to exploit
probable watermark vulnerabilities, the users must be
skilled and the result of such attacks usually leads to great
degradation of the multimedia quality. The scheme that
was proposed can prevent many privacy leaks and drasti-
cally decrease the manual intervention from OSN’s side.
Definitely, user reporting will still have an important role
inside OSNs for cases that demand serious decision mak-
ing, context awareness and additional user feedback, as
not all issues can be automated. For instance a user shares
on an OSN an image depicting someone without his con-
sent (the image is not uploaded from the prosecutor), or
the uploaded image is offensive and misuses the terms of
service of the OSN. The proposed solution apart from
deterring privacy leaks, provides a notification mechanism
so that users become aware of how their shared informa-
tion is treated by others.
The watermarking scheme proposed by Zigomitros
et al. [37] is mainly focused on images, but can be applied
to other multimedia content such as audio and video. The
scheme uses two watermarks, a robust and a semi-fragile,
both explained previously, for storing user’s multimedia
content. A use-case scenario can clarify the need for the
dual watermark scheme. We assume that user A providesto OSN an original multimedia. Then the OSN starts the
embedding process and embeds a robust watermark,
which identifies the multimedia content uniquely and
associates it with the user. A semi-fragile watermark can
be embedded in the host media at the same time or after-
wards [18], since the robust watermark can tolerate this
kind of process. The dual watermarked media is stored in
OSN servers and becomes available to users of the OSN
according to privacy settings defined by its owner.
The robust watermark is used to identify the media and
the owner of it uniquely, and can be recovered even if the
watermarked media has been processed. Meanwhile, the
semi-fragile watermark enables the detection of altera-
tions, malicious or not. The scheme is illustrated in Fig. 1.3. Experiments
3.1. The process
The lack of detailed reference manuals on how the
shared information is managed, processed and stored from
most OSNs, due to their closed source code notion, has led
us to conduct several experiments in order to test the pos-
sible existence of image watermarking schemes. The
experiments that where conducted in [37] were repeated
to test if there is any change in the policies. The original
tests were made on the two most widely used OSNs,
namely Facebook and Google+. However, we decided to
include in our experiments a fast growing OSN, VK
(vk.com), which claims to currently host more than 100
million active users.
For our experiments we used two groups of images,
which are going to be referred as Test Set 1 and Test Set
2, using two user accounts, user A and B respectively. The
concept was to upload both sets of images on the two
accounts and then download again the images from each
users’ profile and perform some comparisons. Firstly, we
downloaded the images from the profile of user A and com-
pared them against their originals. Then, the same proce-
dure was executed for user B. Then, we compared the
downloaded images of the two users, trying to trace possi-
ble differences. The same procedure was repeated for each
OSN, from different PCs and at different time frames. These
steps allowed us to avoid computer fingerprinting and
exclude the time factor from our experiments.
Two groups of images were created. Test Set 1
includes 40 computer generated and grayscale images
from TESTIMAGES.10 The resolution of 20 of these images
Fig. 1. The Zigomitros et al. scheme.
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600  600 pixels. Test Set 2: has also 40 images but are clo-
ser to what could be characterized as typical user images.
This set consists of 20 images with resolution greater than
1200  1200 pixels, which range from 2048  1536 pixels
to 3648  2736 pixels. These images were taken from 4 dif-
ferent devices, 7 were taken from the camera of an Apple
iPhone 3GS, 6 from a Casio EX-Z1050 camera, 4 from a LG
KU 990i mobile and 3 with a Cannon IXUS 130 camera.
The rest of the images, were taken again from TESTIMAGES,
10 images of 1200  1200 pixels and 10 of 600  600 pixels.
The basic image characteristics that are reported in the
experimental results were conducted with Matlab.
3.2. Results
Since the results vary on the three OSNs, we group their
results accordingly. Therefore, firstly we present some gen-
eral remarks and then we discuss our findings for Face-
book, Google+, and finally, for VK.
For the Test Set 1, the comparison between the down-
loaded users’ images showed that there was no difference
in their size or resolution for Google+. The next test was
regarding the differences in filesizes of the downloaded
images compared to the original ones. In Fig. 2 we present
the histogram regarding the differences in filesizes for Test
Set 1. It is obvious that the test set images had nodifference compared to the original ones in their filesize
when they were uploaded on Google+. However, in almost
all of them we notice a reduction on their filesize, when
they were uploaded on Facebook.
Significant differences were traced in the case of Test
Set 2, which consists of high resolution images. The OSNs
have thresholds on the image resolution that can be
shared. This is a rectangle of 2048x1536, in portrait or
landscape orientation. Beyond this bound, images are
resized by both OSNs to fit the optimal resolution within
the aforementioned rectangle. In Fig. 3, we observe again
that Google+ does not make any change in the image size,
if the image is within these bounds. In the Facebook case
however, a big reduction in the filesize is observed, even
if the image was of the appropriate resolution. The distor-
tion on several image characteristics is summarized in
Table 2.
The results for VK presented more differences. The main
difference is that VK has three resolution thresholds for
uploaded images, beyond these thresholds, images are
resized to fit these boundaries. Therefore, only 30 cases
(20 for Test Set 1 and 10 for Test Set 2) fit these boundaries
and could be compared against the original ones, all of
them being identical. Testing the downloaded images from
the profile of user A to the respective from user B, showed
again that they are identical, even in the case of size
reduction.
Fig. 2. Test set 1, image file sizes.
Fig. 3. Test set 2, image file sizes.
Table 2
Mean values of basic image characteristics. The table refers to the images that had no change in their resolution.
Test Set 1 Test Set 2 Test Set 1 Test Set 2 Test Set 1 Test Set 2
Original vs. FB Original vs. FB Original vs. G+ Original vs. G+ Original vs. Vk Original vs. Vk
Mean square error 18.081 14.6884 0 0 4.6918 14.0569
Peak signal to noise ratio 42.2241 41.4557 1 1 49.3408 41.8773
Normalized cross-correlation 1.0013 0.9993 1 1 0.9986 0.9993
Structural content 0.9975 1.0005 1 1 1.0027 1.0004
Average difference 0.5513 0.0441 0 0 0.0265 0.0313
Maximum difference 34.525 55.3333 0 0 18.55 55.6
Normalized absolute error 0.0139 0.0259 0 0 0.008 0.0225
C. Patsakis et al. / Computer Networks 75 (2014) 531–543 5373.3. Discussion
Since there are variations on the results for each
OSN, we have kept the discussion of the results foreach one of them separate. However, as will
become apparent, with very high probability we can
deduce that, no watermarking scheme is used by any
of them.
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VK was detected to have three different thresholds
depending on the vertical and horizontal ratio. In case of
square images that threshold is 1024  1024, for portrait
is 768  1024 and for landscape 1280  960.
The results from VK clearly illustrate the complete lack
of any watermarking mechanism. The images that are not
resized are identical to the original ones. Even when
images are resized, both users end up having the exact
same images. Therefore, it can be safely deduced that no
watermarking has been applied, as this would result to dif-
ferences in the images of the two users.3.3.2. Google+
The results for Google+, are more or less the same with
the first results in [37], with minor differences. In Google+,
when the image resolution does not exceed the aforemen-
tioned size threshold, the uploaded image is exactly the
same with the original one. Compared to the first experi-
ments, an interesting change was observed in the new
images. Whenever Google+ had to resize an image, it
inserted an image ID tag in the file’s metadata, which
was the same for both users. Interestingly, in the new
experiments this only happened for one of the photos
and for one of the users. The embedded tag cannot in any
case be considered as watermark, as it can be removed
very easily. Therefore, we can safely deduce in this case
that no watermarking is being applied. Moreover, if the
image resolution exceeds the threshold, the image is
resized, yet, the image is exactly the same for both users.
Hence, we may assume that no watermarking is being
applied by Google+ on the uploaded images in either case.3.3.3. Facebook
In the case of Facebook, again the results in [37] are
more or less still valid. Before discussing the findings, we
have to highlight at this point that Facebook’s policy is to
convert all uploaded images to the lossy JPEG format. This
is blocking users from sharing animated GIFs and distorts
lossless formats like PNG. If the images are not resized,
then the two downloaded images of the two users are
identical. An interesting behavior was noticed when the
images are above the allowed threshold and have to be
resized. Specifically, all the images from Test Set 1 do not
have any distortions between the users, as their resolution
is below the Facebook thresholds. The images that were
different between the two users were separated, and were
afterwards checked for steganographic content with steg-
detect11 and stegsecret.12 The results from both tools were
negative, so no steganografic method was traced.
The image differences, could hint the existence of an
undetected watermarking scheme. Nevertheless, this
approach would be quite peculiar. The distortion is traced
only on large photos. Watermarking only high resolution
photos does not sound a good or solid privacy policy, as
the allowed thresholds enable attackers to launch attacks
on all lower resolution photos. Perhaps, this behavior could11 www.outguess.org/detection.php.
12 http://stegsecret.sourceforge.net/.be justified by the existence of a resizing algorithm that
uses randomization.
A major difference compared to the previous experi-
ments in Facebook, is the image URLs and file names. In
the previous experiments, the URL contained the user ID
and still does, however, the user ID was embedded in the
filename of the downloaded files as well. This enabled
third parties to trace the source of an image against others,
only from its filename, whenever someone re-posted them
or just sent them.
We should note that in all three OSNs, the links tomedia
files are static. Users can copy and paste these URLs share
them within the same OSN or even worse, share them with
people who are not subscribed to the OSN. Moreover, even
in the case of re-uploading an image from another user’s
profile, there is no notification. This check in particular is
very easy and lightweight to implement, as it could be
checked with the already implemented hashes that are cal-
culated to check the integrity of the uploaded files.
Fig. 3 clearly illustrates that for the images that exceed
the resolution threshold, both Google+ and Facebook apply
a similar algorithm in terms of compression when images
are resized, as the filesizes are almost identical, with the
Facebook being a bit more efficient (see Fig. 4).
4. Proposed solution
4.1. Overview of the solution
As previously discussed, OSNs regard themselves as
completely separate worlds that do not interact. Neverthe-
less, this is not the case, as there is a direct link between all
of them and this is none but their users. More precisely, the
users which have accounts to other OSNs. The idea of ‘‘one
OSN to rule them all’’ does seem probable, as more or less
each OSN has its own target group, providing different
functionality and services to its users. Given that a unifica-
tion of OSN’s is not probable, the only solution to enforcing
privacy measurements across multiple OSNs is their coop-
eration. The scheme of Zigomitros et al. can be applied to a
single OSN, however extending it would result in several
problems. The most obvious one is who is applying the
watermark. Creating a Trusted Third Party (TTP) which
watermarks every medium that is supplied from the OSNs
might sound a good idea. However, this would demand the
generation of new data centers and additional communica-
tion costs. Nevertheless, the major drawback is the fact
that OSNs would have to go under the umbrella of a unique
authority. The latter could be accepted from small OSNs,
however, major OSNs are unlikely to accept such an
approach, given their market position.
We argue that a solution without a TTP and with mini-
mal interaction between OSNs is feasible. This can be
achieved by altering the watermark that each OSN applies
to the uploaded media. We assume that we have n OSNs
that cooperate on enforcing cross-OSN privacy policies on
multimedia content, that share a common watermarking
key K.13 Without loss of generality, we assume that a user13 K is used to watermark each image with a dual watermark, a robust and
a semi-fragile as in the original Zigomitros et al. scheme.
Fig. 4. Managing media files in two social networks.
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for any multimedia file. We estimate that the least informa-
tion that should be embedded in each watermark is the fol-
lowing: The userID which allows each OSN to determine the
owner of the media. A mediaID field which notifies the OSN
where the image was originally hosted. There is also a need
for a timestamp field to indicate when the media was water-
marked. Finally, we believe that a publication license ID is
also needed. This information might seem unnecessary, as
an OSN will have to check for the user’s policy. Nevertheless,
this may solve other problems that are going to be discussed
in the following paragraphs.
Moreover, we assume that each OSN has its own private
and public key pair ðPrivOSNi ; PubOSNi Þ; i 2 f1; . . . ;ng and a
symmetric key SymOSNi .
Let us assume that Alice uploads an image to OSN1, then
OSN1 creates a vector v as follows:
v ¼ ðESymOSN1 ðUserIDjjrndÞ;MediaID; Timestamp,
PublicationLicense; EPubOSNi ðOSNm1DataÞ; . . . ; EPubOSNi ðOSNmk
DataÞÞwhere:fm1; . . .mkg# f1 . . .ng and rnd a random
value.
The first field is encrypted with SymOSN1 so that OSN1
can recover the UserID quickly. UserIDs are salted with a
random value in order to obfuscate the UserID. Leaving
the userID just encrypted allows other OSNs to profile
users by storing the encrypted form of their IDs. If they
are salted, then only the original OSN can find the owner
of the media and all other OSNs are hidden not only from
the owner, but from any other media of the same user.
The next three fields are not encrypted, so that everyone
can retrieve the mediaID, the timestamp and the publicationlicense of the user. Finally, the rest of the fields contain
information that is specific for each OSN and can be
retrieved only by them. The vector is signed by OSN1 so
the information that is embedded in the watermark w is
w ¼ v ; EPrivOSN1 ðHðvÞÞ, where H is a secure hash function.
Using K;OSN1 embeds the dual watermark in the photo
and publishes it.
If a user wants to upload the same photo to OSN2, then
OSN2 will use K to extract the watermark. From that, OSN2
will get the vector w and verify that it is correctly received
from the digital signature. Based on the publication license
and the message that OSN1 has encrypted for OSN2;OSN2
will decide whether or not it will publish the photo and
with what privacy settings, notifying OSN1 about these
actions.
4.2. Discussion
The proposed scheme enables users to apply their pri-
vacy policies on their multimedia content across multiple
OSNs. It is important to highlight that the users do not
need to be registered to all OSNs to allow this functionality.
Moreover, users can be notified of any attempts to violate
their privacy. The scheme does not need any trusted third
party, therefore, there is no further trust dependency.
The use of timestamp in watermarks is considered
essential as they can be used to define fine-grained policies
in our scheme. Since each photo is watermarked on upload,
users can use this information to define time-based poli-
cies. For instance, a user may allow a photo to be public
after 2 years, or stop sharing one after 5 years. On top of
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mine which user has uploaded the content first and deduce
its origin. The latter can be understood only in the case
when a new OSN joins and checks its content against its
peers.14
The introduced publication license field is very impor-
tant, as users may use standard licenses such as Creative
Commons15 or define custom ones, excluding specific users
or OSNs from distributing the content. It is clear that per-
sonal photos will have custom policies, while others will
have more generic ones. To illustrate this concept, we
assume that Alice publishes a photo with a ‘‘Creative Com-
mons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported
License’’. This means that Alice does not allow modifications
of her work or commercial use. Bob finds this photo and can
publish it in his profile. If Alice decides to withdraw the
photo, then this will not have any impact on Bob’s profile
and Bob will not have any problem with publishing the
photo even after Alice removes the photo. Nevertheless, if
Bob has downloaded the image, processed it and tries to
upload it to OSN2 where Alice is not registered, OSN2 will
detect the alterations from the dual watermark and since
the license does not allow modifications, block Bob from
uploading the photo.
In another scenario, Bob might try to upload a photo
from Alice’s profile in OSN1, where her characteristics are
quite clear to the professional OSN2 where Alice is not reg-
istered. Since Alice’s photo is personal, she has water-
marked it with a non distribute license. Therefore, if Bob
wants to perform an identity theft attack to Alice, OSN2 will
block his actions by reading the embedded watermark.
The scheme allows OSNs to have different policies
among themselves, without publicly disclosing them.
Hence, several OSNs, depending on their interests, conflicts
and policies, may choose to cooperate under different
schemes, without exposing critical information to the rest
of the participants. This way, Alice who is registered in
OSN1 can allow only users from OSN2 to re-upload some
of her photos. Given that Alice might have two accounts
on different accounts, she can notify OSN1 so that photos
are co-owned from another user from OSN2, specifying
her ID in OSN2 and vice versa.
The proposed scheme reestablishes the roles of OSNs, as
not only do they host content, but they become Content
Certification Authorities (CCAs). CCAs can certify the origin
of a submitted multimedia file, hence detect if it belongs to
one of its users or not, to the users of another affiliated OSN
and even detect alterations.
Obviously, this scheme enables not only privacy aware
sharing of media content, but furthermore the unification
of user accounts among different OSNs. This unification,
might seem on first sight scary for most of the OSNs, espe-
cially the ones with fewer users. Nevertheless, depending
on the differentiation of the services that each of them pro-
vides, this unification can only enhance their status. This14 It should be highlighted that while the proposal is straightforward
regarding new content, managing already published content or how a new
OSN joins is more complicated and is going to be discussed extensively in
future work.
15 http://creativecommons.org/.can be achieved due to the fact that the unification can
enable developers and OSNs to deliver more solid, useful
and fine grained solutions to the users. The decentralized
nature of the scheme enables the equal treatment of all
the participants, which is very crucial for its continuity,
creating a web of trust not only among the OSNs, but
among their subscribers as well.
One of main advantages of this scheme is that user’s
privacy is greatly enhanced, as the user has total control
of his media. He can keep track of where his media files
are being used, who has access to them and revoke or grant
access to them on real time, independently of the OSN that
he is registered. The obvious drawback of this solution is
what happens with the already shared content and how
to tackle with cases were different users share the same
content and one of them declares ownership. Of course,
human intervention cannot be avoided, yet the best
approach would be to watermark all this content by cur-
rent OSNs and mark it as non further distributable, unless
all the parties agree on the ownership.
Finally, the proposed scheme allows OSNs to automati-
cally respond to changes in the legal system. In the upcom-
ing years, many changes are expected to be made in the
privacy laws in national and international level. This may
have serious implications to OSNs as they will have to
change the way they distribute content according to the
new laws. A framework, as the one we propose allows
OSNs to automatically conform, as the changes in one of
themwill lead to cascading changes to the rest of the OSNs,
significantly reducing the cost of law compliance.
Additionally, the proposed solution could enable com-
mon ownership schemes. Let us assume that two users
agree to share the ownership of a photo. Then, they declare
this to the OSN they are registered to, which generates a
user ID that maps to both of them. This way, each user
can set his own privacy preferences independently, and
the OSN will enforce the intersection of their policies,
whenever it has to be accessed. If a violation of the policies
is detected or someone tries to share it, or its modification,
to another OSN, this action will be reported, the OSN will
apply the necessary policies and send the according notifi-
cations to the users.
Finally, OSNs instead of using the proposed dual water-
marking scheme, they could use a public watermarking
scheme, such as [34]. The adoption of such scheme pro-
vides another layer of security. The use of such scheme
removed the risk of leakage of the common watermarking
key k.
Some OSNs might decide not to play fairly, trying to cre-
ate an advantage for their users. In the proposed scheme,
the key is common for all OSNs, therefore, malicious OSNs
can track where the watermark is stored and alter it, so
that it appears as the medium belongs to their users. While
this attack is possible, if OSNs use a public watermarking
scheme, then this action cannot be performed, as the
embedding key is different from the extraction key. Addi-
tionally, this act can easily be traced and the misbehaving
OSN prosecuted not only by the users, but from the other
OSNs who have economic advantages to close down one
of their competitors. It becomes apparent that enforcing
the scheme by some OSNs may force the others to act
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the European Data Protection Supervisor P. Hustinx, ‘‘con-
trollers will therefore also require them to think better
about the legitimacy of what they intend to do. . .the new
framework will also provide for strong sanctions – admin-
istrative fines of millions of euros – for the most serious
cases where these rules have not been respected.’’ There-
fore, regulatory authorities are expected to enforce such
policies in the near future. In this context, misbehaving
OSNs are expected to face serious legal consequences.16 www.pheed.com.
17 www.badoo.com.5. Economical impact
Most of the OSNs are operating under the so-called
‘‘freemium’’ model, meaning that they offer the service free
to the users, in exchange of accessing, mining their data
and offering targeted advertisement to their customers.
Watermarking their massive amounts of photos is cer-
tainly a serious cost, as all this procedure demands many
additional processing hours. Therefore a very important
question that has to be addressed to is the economical
impact of the proposal in the current established business
model.
To fully understand the economical impact of the pro-
posal it is important to understand how much computa-
tional effort is needed to apply this scheme. To estimate
it, we used a Java implementation of a typical DCT water-
marking scheme. On a desktop computer running on Intel
Core i7-3770 CPU clocked at 3.40 GHz and without a fully
optimized implementation, a photograph with resolution
of 2048  1536 needs on average approximately 1.5 s to
be watermarked per core. Given that this processor has 8
cores, such a computer can watermark around 460,800
photos per day. According to [16], each day, 350 million
photos are uploaded to Facebook. Therefore, Facebook
would need approximately 760 such computers to balance
the computational effort for its daily traffic. On the other
hand, it takes around 1 s to extract the watermark. It
should be highlighted that these figures could be further
reduced with a more optimized implementation or with
exploiting GPUs.
The cost of maintaining this additional infrastructure
cannot be considered neither negligible nor prohibitive,
nevertheless we believe that it is something manageable.
Currently, even if millions of people are using OSNs, shar-
ing huge amounts of information, they are aware that this
way is not the most privacy-aware method. If some OSNs
decide to build or reformat their structure, offering more
privacy to their users via their collaboration, on the one
hand they will increase their maintenance expenses, on
the other hand it is expected that they will attract many
additional revenues. Firstly, providing a feature such as
cross-OSN privacy policies is expected to attract more
users, especially at this point of time where people are
becoming more aware of privacy. The latter was sparked
by recent relations about background actions from secret
government agencies. Many start-up companies are rush-
ing to exploit this new niche market of privacy. Therefore,
since the proposed scheme minimizes the leakage of users’
information, many new users will be attracted. Moreover,people will be able to share more information, or even
more sensitive, as the privacy-aware shift from these OSNs
will renew their trust to the service. All the above, make
the collaborating OSNs more attractive to advertising com-
panies, as they will host more people, more information to
mine and perhaps more valuable for the advertising
companies.
A privacy-aware service for subscribers, is an additional
feature that can attract artists of all genres to publish and
share more of their work on OSNs. With this target group,
but without watermarks, Pheed16 is gradually getting more
and more users promoting itself as a free social multimedia
platform that allows multimedia sharing and streaming.
Given that many artists do not share their work due to leak-
ages, the proposed scheme would make such OSNs even
more attractive.
In other applications or extensions of OSNs, watermark-
ing techniques are considered essential, as they provide
the necessary trust to the users that access them. Typical
examples are professional, medical and dating OSNs or
their extensions. In such cases, it is crucial to guarantee
that the users are real and that their profiles contain the
right information. Identity theft or even extortion attacks
on such cases can harm the public and professional image
of the victim severally and immediately. To address such
challenges, applications such as Badoo17 have resulted to
visible watermarks, degrading the actual medium. However,
the necessary functionality is not provided, as these water-
marks could be easily cropped in many cases.
Consequently, it is clear that subscriptions of premium
accounts or the attraction of more users and better quality
of content sharing can mitigate the costs of applying
watermarking schemes in OSNs and maintaining the
needed infrastructure.
6. Conclusions
The privacy of the multimedia content which is a signif-
icant ingredient for the success of OSNs, has not drawn the
proper attention yet. The OSNs so far only deal with meta-
data of multimedia content by erasing them or by letting
users set privacy settings for the geolocation of the content
if available. As OSNs affect more and more our daily lives,
the development of new security and privacy policies for
multimedia content becomes essential. Towards this end,
this work introduces a scheme that allows users to enforce
their privacy policies not only on multimedia shared in the
OSN that they belong to, but among others to which they
are not registered. This is achieved by the use of water-
marks on the multimedia with either public encryption
algorithms or public watermarking techniques. The major
contribution of this work is the unification of privacy pol-
icies across multiple OSNs in a distributed way without
the use of trusted third parties.
The proposed solution can be implemented without
having to redesign current OSNs from scratch, therefore
it can be easily adopted, in terms of deployment. One
may argue that the proposed methodology hints towards
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protect the users’ content and users could opt in or out
of this service for all or some of their multimedia content.
Additionally, we have quantified the cost of adopting the
proposed solution in terms of computational effort and
proposed solutions to counter the economic cost.
As discussed, the main issue towards adopting this
solution is the already uploaded content. It is a fact that
the implementation of this solution will give ownership
to users for all their uploaded content even if they do not
have the right to own it. If an image, for example, belongs
to user A, yet user B also uploaded it, it would seem that it
belongs to user B, so user A should report it in order to set-
tle the dispute. The holder of the original multimedia con-
tent can upload it again at any time on the OSN even if a
previous watermarked version of this content has been
uploaded by another user before the implementation. Def-
initely, such a scenario is realistic, yet we can see that the
balance of what can be automated from the proposed solu-
tion and what is left on the human level is drastically
decreased, leaving far less problems to be manually solved.
Nevertheless, the complexity of this issue should be exam-
ined thoroughly in future work. Finally, it has to be noted
that the more that such solutions are not applied, the more
the cost is increased, as users are uploading new and more
content every day.
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